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Abstract. We study a model of a spatial evolutionary game, based on the Prisoner’s dilemma
for two regular arrangements of players, on a square lattice and on a triangular lattice.
We analyze steady state distributions of players which evolve from irregular, random initial
configurations. We find significant differences between the square and triangular lattice, and we
characterize the geometric structures which emerge on the triangular lattice.
1. Introduction
Methods of statistical physics, originally developed for describing collective phenomena in
macroscopic collections of atoms and molecules, find their uses in studying a broad range of
phenomena, which, traditionally, would be considered out of scope. Some problems with origins
in social sciences can be cast in the language of the emergence of collective behavior from
elementary interactions between individual agents. [1] A prominent one among these is the so-
called evolution of cooperation [2], i.e., the emergence of cooperative behavior where individual
interactions favor competition.
A prototypical model where cooperation emerges from pairwise interactions is provided by the
classic Prisoner’s dilemma game. Its spatially extended versions, where a macroscopic number
of agents repeatedly interact via the rules of the Prisoner’s dilemma contain surprisingly rich
variety of behaviors, including scenarios where cooperation evolves in the long-time limit [3, 4].
A very simple yet highly non-trivial model, brought forward by Nowak and May [5, 6],
defines the synchronous, discrete-time, deterministic evolution of an ensemble of agents, which
are arranged in a regular pattern. Despite its apparent simplicity, the model displays surprisingly
rich behavior and contains a series of dynamic regimes, separated by sharp transitions.
A natural question to ask is what is the role of the geometry of the arrangement of players.
Original work [5, 7], and recent efforts [8, 9] mostly concentrated on the square grid geometry,
where agents are located at the sites of a square lattice in two spatial dimensions. A priori, it
is not immediately clear whether a different local connectivity has a qualitative effect: on one
hand large-scale structures should be insensitive to the local details; on the other hand there are
examples (e.g., variants of percolation problem, [10]) where processes on square and triangular
lattice display significant differences.
In this paper, we thus compare the dynamics of the evolutionary game on the square and
triangular lattices. The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe the model
and review some previously known results. Section 3 contains results of simulations and data
analysis. In Section 5 we discuss results and future work.
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2. Model of spatial evolution game
A prototypical model of the game theory is the so-called Prisoner’s dilemma (PD), played by
two players in discrete time steps. In each round of the game, a player uses one of two possible
strategies, cooperate, C, or defect, D, and receives a payoff which depends on the strategies of
the player and its opponent [11]. We use the following payoff structure [5, 7]: (i) If two players
are D , they receive nothing; (ii) If both players C, each of them receives a payoff of S, which
we set to S = 1 without loss of generality; (iii) In the interaction of C and D, the D receives a
payoff T > S and the C receives zero. This way, the payoff structure only depends on a single
parameter, the payoff parameter b = T/S.
For the spatial version of the game [5, 7], we consider a collection of players arranged in the
vertices of a regular grid. In each round, an agent plays pairwise games with its neighbors, and
the total payoff of an agent is the sum of the pair-wise payoffs. The game is globally synchronous,
so that the strategy of a player is only updated after all pairwise games are finished and all payoffs
for all players are known.
Once all payoffs are known, players update their strategies: each agent adopts the strategy
which led to the maximum payoff among its neighbors. This concludes the time step, and the
game repeats with the new distribution of strategies.
We consider two arrangements of players. First, we consider a square grid, where players are
arranged in the sites of a square lattice. In a round, an agent plays nine games: with itself and
its eight neighbors (chess king’s moves). We include self-interaction for consistency with earlier
work [5, 7]. Second, we consider the triangular lattice arrangement. Since the triangular lattice
can be thought of as a square lattice with additional diagonal bonds (SW and NE, but not SE
and NW), a round of the game has an agent interacting with its six neighbors (and itself).
The evolution of the game can be thought of as a specific kind of a cellular automation
[12]. We note however that in the language of cellular automata, these games have rather large
transition tables: the state of a player at time step t depends on the states of its next-to-next-
nearest neighbors at time step t− 1. This way, the transition table for the square grid game has
225 rules, and 219 rules for the triangular grid.
The dynamics of the game is governed by the payoff ratio, b. The discrete structure of payoffs
gives rise to a series of dynamic regimes separated by transitions at discrete values of b. Given
an initial configuration, the dynamics of the game is exactly identical for all values of b between
two consecutive transitions.
The transition points themselves are simply rational fractions with the numerator and
denominator between one and the number of pairwise games played by an agent (i.e., the
number of nearest neighbors on the lattice plus one for self-interaction.) For the square lattice,
the candidate fractions between 1 < b < 3 are
9/8, 8/7, 7/6, 6/5, 5/4, 9/7, 4/3, 7/5, 3/2, 8/5, 5/3, 7/4, 9/5, 2, 9/4, 7/3, 5/2, 8/3.
On the triangular lattice, the transitions are located at
7/6, 6/5, 5/4, 4/3, 7/5, 3/2, 5/3, 7/4, 2, 7/3, 5/2.
3. Dynamic regimes and steady states of the game
We consider a finite game field of the size L × L with periodic boundary conditions in both
directions for both square and triangular lattices. We start from random configuration, where
at t = 0 an agent is C with probability p0 = 0.1. We directly simulate the game numerically.
We let the system evolve for a certain number of burn-in steps (we typically take 1000 steps for
the burn-in). Fig. 1 shows the steady state average density of cooperators, fC , (i.e., the number
of cooperators divided by the total number of sites, L2) as a function of the payoff parameter
b. Transitions are clearly manifest as sharp jumps in the density of the components. To gain
insight into the nature of the transitions, it is instructive to consider small isolated objects,
“islands” of one strategy immersed into the sea of the other strategy.
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Figure 1. Concentration of cooperators C, fC , as a function of the payoff parameter b. Left:
square lattice. Right: triangular lattice. Each point is an average over 10 measurements taken
every 1000 steps after 1000 burn-in steps for 10 independent realizations of the initial conditions
with the initial density of C, p0 = 0.1. Dashed lines are to guide an eye. The game field size is
L = 60. See text for discussion.
3.1. Square lattice
This geometry was discussed in detail in [7], so here we only mention the key findings. For b < 1,
cooperators always win. Defectors win unconditionally for b > 3. A single isolated defector is
stable for 1 < b < 9/8.
For b > 9/8, a variety of lattice animals is possible: there are various gliders, rotators,
breathers and so on. Consider a straight D line one cell thick, separating two half-planes of
C. It grows in the perpendicular direction for b > 3/2, and becomes three sites thick at the
next step. A straight line interface between C and D grows into the direction of C for b > 3,
while cooperators invade the D region across the straight line interface for b < 2. This way,
for 3/2 < b < 2, a straight line of D alternates between thickness of one and three D with the
period of 2 time steps.
A corner of D grows outwards into the C region for b > 9/5. Therefore, in the regime of
9/5 < b < 2, a square 3 × 3 cluster of D grows from the corners and shrinks in the middle of
each face. This way, for 9/5 < b < 2, an isolated D generates a series of self-similar patterns,
“evolutionary rugs”, with the mean density fC = 12 log 2− 8 [7].
3.2. Triangular lattice
The analysis of specific isolated objects is similar to that on the square lattice, Sec. 3.1. An
isolated defector disappears after a single step for b < 1. For 1 < b < 7/6 a single defector is
stable. For b > 7/6 a single defector grows to a cluster of seven D, see Fig. 2. Further evolution
of the seven-D cluster depends on b: for b < 6/3, the cluster shrinks back to a single D at the
center, so that we have a blinker of the size alternating between 1 and 7. For b > 7/3, it keeps
growing, while for 2 < b < 7/3 a seven-D cluster is stable.
A straight line of D of unit thickness disappears if b < 5/4. Otherwise, it remains stable for
5/4 < b < 7/4, and grows for b > 7/4, see Fig. 2. The result of the latter case, a line of D of
Figure 2. (Color online.) Left: The cluster of seven D. In a single time step, an isolated D
(red) grows to a cluster of seven sites (yellow) for b > 7/6. The cluster becomes a blinker with
period of one time step for 7/6 < b < 2, is stable for 2 < b < 7/3 and grows without bound for
b > 7/3. Right: Time evolution of a straight line of D. See text for discussion. Color coding is
consistent with Fig. 3
thickness three, remains stable for 5/2 < b < 7/2, and shrinks back for the values of b below
that range. Therefore, a straight line blinker with unit period exists in the range 7/4 < b < 5/2.
3.3. Unstructured initial conditions: square lattice
Fig. 3 shows representative snapshots of the game field in the steady state which develops
from a random initial configuration with p0 = 0.1 for several values of the payoff parameter
b. For b < 9/5, the system develops relatively static web-like structures of defectors. The
most non-trivial regime is 9/5 < b < 2. In this regime both kinds of strategies grow into
regions of the opposite strategy, leading to the chaotic evolution where the state of the game
changes significantly at the time scale of several time steps, and the mean density of cooperators
fluctuates around the fC ≈ 0.31 (see Sec 3.1). [5].
3.4. Unstructured initial conditions: triangular lattice
Fig. 4 shows representative snapshots of the game field in the steady state which develops from
a random initial configuration with p0 = 0.1 for several values of the payoff parameter b. Typical
steady state distributions of strategies strongly depend on the payoff parameter.
Figure 3. (Color online.) Representative snapshots of the game field for b = 1.74 (left), b = 1.79
(center) and b = 1.81 (right). The color coding is consistent with Ref. [5, 7]: blue is C, red is
D, yellow is a D that was a C in the preceding round, and green is a C that was a D in the
preceding round [8]. See text for discussion.
Figure 4. (Color online.) Representative snapshots of the triangular grid game field for
b ∈ (5/3, 7/4) (left), b ∈ (7/4, 2) (center) and b ∈ (2, 7/3) (right). Here the field size is L = 60.
The color coding is consistent with Fig. 3. See text for discussion.
For 2 < b < 7/3, the system develops an unstructured pattern of C and D, which can be
thought of as a random collection of seven-D clusters (cf Sec. 3.2), arranged in random ways,
which are dictated by a specific realization of initial conditions. The pattern is mostly static,
with small-scale oscillations at the boundaries.
Across the transition at b = 2, typical arrangements of the game field are very different. The
field is dominated by cooperators, with relatively small isolated regions of D blinkers consisting
of a static core D region, surrounded by a layer of “swingers”, which frequently change their
strategy.
For 5/3 < b < 7/4, typical patters are also different. In this regime, defectors also arrange
in static web-like “backbone” which is interconnected and spans the system size. (This is in
contrast to regime of 7/4 < b < 2, where D clusters are isolated.) Relatively small clusters of
“swingers”, where strategies oscillate with periods of the order of several time steps attach to
this static web of D.
4. Switching times
To further quantify the dynamics of the game, we study the mean time for for an agent to
change their strategy. Specifically, we perform the following simulation: Starting from a random
configuration, we evolve it for 104 steps (after 103 burn-in steps). For each player we record
the time steps where they switched the strategy, and compute the mean time between switches.
Results are summarized in Table 1. For each range of the payoff parameter b we show the
number of players who switched their strategy at least once, nsw, and the mean time between
switches for these players, τsw.
For the square lattice, b ∈ (9/5, 2) stands out: all L2 players change their strategies with the
time scale of around four steps. All other regimes are much more static, with a relatively small
fraction of “swinging players” who change the strategy every time step on average.
On the triangular lattice, the special regime is 7/4 < b < 2, where a sizable fraction of players
engage in relatively slow processes, with time scales much larger then one. We note that the
time scales are comparable to the simulation times, therefore we cannot yet rule out that what
we observe is some very slow transient phenomenon. All other regimes are static, with only a
small fraction of fast “swinging” players.
5. Conclusions and outlook
We study an evolutionary game based on the Prisoner’s Dilemma with regular arrangements
of agents in a plane. Despite its apparent simplicity, this deterministic, globally synchronous
game displays surprisingly rich behavior in the long time limit. We compare the steady states
of the game, for two ways of arranging the players, on the square grid and on the triangular
Triangular lattice Square lattice
b range nsw τsw b range nsw τsw
5/4 92 1.0 4/3 99 1.1
4/3 12 1.0 7/5 7 1.5
7/5 153 1.0 3/2 233 1.5
3/2 64 1.1 8/5 148 1.1
5/3 57 1.7 5/3 105 1.1
7/4 348 590 7/4 13 1.0
2 35 1.3 9/5 900 4.1
Table 1. Switching times and numbers for the square and triangular lattice. The simulation is
104 steps on lattices with L = 30. nsw is the number of players, which switched their strategy
more then once, and τsw is the mean time between switches for these nsw players. Each row
shows results for the payoff parameter between the value in the row and the next row (e.g., “b
range 5/4” means 5/4 < b < 4/3). See text for discussion.
grid. The local structure of connections between neighboring players significantly affects the
possible steady states: for the square grid, there exists a chaotic regime; on the triangular
lattice, steady states are mostly static. However, these static patterns are significantly different
for different values of the payoff parameter. It would be interesting further characterize these
emergent geometric structures and their oscillatory patterns of evolution, which we intend to do
in a future study.
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